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PETER VAN INWAGEN ON THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
William L. Rowe

In his book The Problem o f Evil, Van Inwagen aims to establish that the prob
lem of evil is a failure. My article considers his response to the evidential
problem of evil. His response relies on a fundamental assumption: "Every
possible world God could have actualized contains patterns of suffering mor
ally equivalent to those of the actual world, or else is massively irregular."
While it may not be unreasonable to suggest that it is logically possible that an
omnipotent, omniscient being is unable to actualize a better world, a world
with somewhat less, prolonged animal suffering, this hardly amounts to an
adequate response to the evidential problem of evil, an argument that endeav
ors to establish that it is more likely than not that an omniscient, omnipotent
being could have created such a world.

In his Gifford Lectures, delivered at the University of St Andrews in 2003,
van Inwagen presents a comprehensive examination of the problem of
evil, both the so-called logical problem of evil and the evidential problem
of evil.1 His aim is to show that "the argument from evil is a failure."
Putting aside the logical problem of evil, in this essay I will examine van
Inwagen's discussion of the evidential problem of evil in Lecture 6: "The
Local Argument from Evil," and Lecture 7: "The Suffering of Beasts." By
'a beast,' van Inwagen presumably means any animal other than a human
being. I am assuming here that a human being is correctly characterized
as a rational animal. With that assumption in mind, in this essay I will
take any non-human animal—a fawn or a dog (even a faithful, seeing-eye
dog)—to be one of van Inwagen's beasts. My aim is to critically evaluate
van Inwagen's argument in support of his claim that the horrendous evils
in our world provide no good reason to doubt that there is an omnipotent,
omniscient, perfectly good being who created the world. The evils occur
ring on our planet—the part of the world we are acquainted with—include
not only the sufferings that human beings undergo but also the sufferings
that non-human animals (beasts) undergo.
One further back-ground point should be mentioned before discussing
van Inwagen's response to the evidential problem of evil. Christian theists
tell us that God is a god of love. From my early days as a Christian, I recall
hearing ministers and evangelists placing great emphasis on the love of
God for his creatures. And this love, we were told, remains in force even
when humans turn away from God and choose the path of sin—for "God
hates the sin, but loves the sinner." Moreover, he cares for those who suf
fer. Indeed, he cares for all his creatures, not just human beings. I also recall
that when I was a young lad I saw a movie in which a Christian family had
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a dog they dearly loved. Toward the end of the film, the members of the
family, as well as their dog, died. The final scene pictured the family re
uniting upon entering heaven, and being overjoyed on hearing the familiar
sound of their beloved dog, barking and wagging his tail as he rushed to
meet them. Such stories, of course, have little, if anything, to do with the
issue at hand, except to remind us that human beings are capable of form
ing attachments to non-human animals that are both profound and deep.
I am one of those human beings. Over the years I have loved five different
dogs, and mourned the death of four of them—the fifth is still alive and my
constant companion. Undoubtedly, the God of traditional theism, if he ex
ists, is aware that his human creatures form strong, lasting attachments not
only to other humans, but to some of van Inwagen's beasts as well, attach
ments that for dogs, as well as humans, are often both deep and lasting.
In his discussion of the evidential argument from evil, van Inwagen
says that the amount of evil in the world is not the central difficulty. I think
he is right about this point. If each particular evil were in itself bad, but not
too bad, then even should the total amount of evil in the world be enor
mous, we would not be faced by the central issue raised by the evidential
argument from evil. For it is horrendous evils that are the focus of the
evidential argument from evil. Many such evils appear to be unnecessary
for any outweighing good and would be easily preventable by an omnipo
tent, omniscient being, provided such a being both exists and cares about
the welfare of the sentient beings he has brought into existence. As van
Inwagen notes:
There are many horrors, vastly many, from which no discernible
good results—and certainly no good, discernible or not, that an om
nipotent being couldn't have achieved without the horror; in fact
without any suffering at all.2
He provides an example of such a horror—a young woman whose arms
were chopped off at the elbows by a man with an ax, is raped, and left to
die. Although she undergoes enormous suffering, she survives and must
live the rest of her life "without arms and with the memory of what she
had been forced to endure."3 How does van Inwagen respond to such ex
amples of evil, examples that leave one wondering why an omnipotent,
omniscient, perfectly good being would permit them to occur in such
abundance? He first sets forth an argument for the non-existence of God
based on this particular horrendous evil, an argument he describes as
"modeled" on the central argument of my essay, "The Problem of Evil
and Some Varieties of Atheism." Referring to events in the example as 'the
Mutilation,' van Inwagen's argument proceeds as follows:
(1) If the Mutilation had not occurred, if it had been, so to speak,
simply left out of the world, the world would be no worse than it
is. (It would seem, in fact, that the world would be significantly
better if the Mutilation had been left out of it, but my argument
does not require that premise.)
(2) The Mutilation in fact occurred (and was a horror).
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(3) If a morally perfect creator could have left a certain horror out of
the world he created, and the world would have been no worse
had that horror been left out of it than it would have been if it
had included that horror, then the morally perfect creator would
have left the horror out of the world he created—or at any rate
he would have left it out if he had been able to.
(4) If an omnipotent being created the world, he was able to leave
the Mutilation out of the world (and was able to do so in a way
that would have left the world otherwise much as it is).
There is, therefore, no omnipotent and morally perfect creator.4
As van Inwagen notes, some theists (skeptical theists) respond to my ar
gument concerning the fawn's five days of terrible suffering, due to be
ing severely burned while trapped in a forest fire caused by lightning, by
claiming that, for all we know, had an omnipotent being prevented the
fawn's being trapped and severely burned, or prevented one day of its
five days of terrible suffering, he would have had to forfeit some greater
good or permit the occurrence of some other evil just as bad or worse. Van
Inwagen does not respond to the Mutilation in this way, indicating that
he regards premise 1 of the mutilation argument as "fairly plausible." In
opposition to the skeptical theist's response, van Inwagen tells us that in
his view it is even more plausible, "very plausible indeed, to suppose the
following existential generalization of (1) is true":
There has been, in the history of the world, at least one horror such
that, if it had not existed, if it had been, so to speak, simply left out of
the world, the world would be no worse than it is.5
One might take van Inwagen's existential generalization as suggesting
that had God prevented this terrible evil from occurring, the world may
well have been no worse than it is. But, after reflection,6 I have concluded
that he means to say that the world would have been better had the mu
tilation been prevented. Indeed, when he first presents premise (1) of his
argument he adds the following to that premise:
(It would seem, in fact, that the world would be significantly better
if the Mutilation had been left out of it, but my argument doesn't
require that premise.)7
Given that God is perfectly good, as well as omnipotent and omniscient,
one might infer that van Inwagen would accept, or at least not object to,
this slightly altered version of the premise I use in "The Problem of Evil
and Some Varieties of Atheism":
An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the
occurrence of any intense suffering he foresees as about to occur un
less he could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or
permitting some evil equally bad or worse.8
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But since the weaker premise he employs is sufficient for his argument, he
has no need to use a premise stronger than it. So, it seems right to infer that
he also holds that there has been, in the history of the world, at least one
horror such that, if it had not existed, if it had been, so to speak, simply left
out of the world, it is likely that the world would be less bad (i.e., better)
than it is.9 For if it should be true that were God to have prevented one
horrendous evil, or many horrendous evils, he knew that all such efforts
on his part would be in vain, that the world would be just as bad (i.e., no
better) were he to have prevented those evils as it would be were he to
permit them, it may well make no sense for God to make the effort.
Before proceeding further, it must be noted that in van Inwagen's view
God is like us, a temporal being. As opposed to the traditional (standard)
view that God is eternal, outside of time, and thus not limited in knowl
edge of the distant future by existing only in the always changing present,
van Inwagen holds that God's knowledge of the future free acts of crea
tures is limited by the fact that the future has not yet occurred, a point that
necessitates a different understanding of the traditional conception of the
doctrine of divine omniscience. He also holds that "the existence of a being
who knows the future is incompatible with free will."10 This doesn't mean,
of course, that when observing the man raising the ax while chasing the
woman God doesn't know that unless he intervenes the woman will very
likely be severely injured if not killed. For God will be able to anticipate
what that supposedly free creature with the ax is intent on doing. And
in the case of the fawn's five days of terrible suffering, God would surely
know that after all that suffering only death will come, and so he would
know that it would be a merciful act on his part to help the fawn die on the
first day, rather than leaving it to suffer terribly for four more days.11 So,
there is good reason for van Inwagen to see the need of responding to the
argument from evil. What then is his response? It comes, if it comes at all,
in Lecture 4 (The Global Argument from Evil) and Lecture 5 (The Global
Argument from Evil Continued).
It is important to note a view that emerges in van Inwagen's book, a
view that suggests a somewhat different understanding of the problem of
evil. I will call it, the "playthings of chance" explanation for the much of
the evil that occurs in the world. On this explanation, God becomes impa
tient with humans for their failure to come to know, love, and serve him;
and sees the need to enlighten them. As van Inwagen puts it:
They must know what it means to be separated from him. And what
it means to be separated from God is to live in a world of horrors.
If God simply "canceled" all the horrors of this world by an endless
series of miracles, he would thereby frustrate his own plan of recon
ciliation. If he did that we would be content with our lot and should
see no reason to cooperate with him.12
Perhaps realizing that this makes God sound a bit like Al Capone, van
Inwagen adds:
But God does shield us from much evil, from a great proportion of
the sufferings that would be a natural consequence of our rebellion.
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If he did not, all human history would be at least this bad: every hu
man society would be on the moral level of Nazi Germany.13
(To make a claim like this presupposes that if the world were to exist with
out God there would be no such thing as morality, or at least that humans
would be incapable of discovering or developing a system of morality.
What we do know is that as humans have evolved they have developed
(or discovered) a system of morality. And we also know that humans are
able to act morally, even though they all too often fail to do so. What, in my
judgment, we don't know is whether there is such a being as God.)
We've noted the skeptical theist's appeal to human ignorance of the
goods that God will know as a justification for God's permission of the
fawn's five days of terrible suffering: the suggestion that perhaps there is
some greater good that God (even though omnipotent) is unable to realize
should he prevent even one day of the fawn's five days of terrible suffer
ing. And, undoubtedly, skeptical theists will respond in a similar way to
the van Inwagen's argument from evil based on the molestation. They will
reject the first premise of his argument:
If the Mutilation had not occurred, if it had been, so to speak, sim
ply left out of the world, the world would be no worse than it is. (It
would seem, in fact, that the world would be significantly better if
the Mutilation had been left out of it, but my argument does not re
quire that premise.)14
For they will say that for all we know, had God prevented the man from
chopping off her arm and raping her, God, even though omnipotent,
would have had to forfeit some greater good or permit some other evil
just as bad or worse. As implausible as this claim may seem to an agnostic,
one must allow that it is a logical possibility. But since many false claims
are logically possible, I suspect that van Inwagen's aim is to provide a
somewhat stronger response, a response that will be something more than
a logical possibility, a response that will not only provide a way for the
committed believer to retain her belief, but will seem reasonable, if not
persuasive, to an agnostic.
When I wrote about the fawn's suffering,15 I did so on the assumption
that theists do not confine the problem of evil just to what befalls human
beings who are thought to possess free will, but see the problem as ex
tending to the sufferings of animals as well. If so, it does seem reasonable
to think that had the fawn's five days of suffering been prevented, or if not
prevented then mercifully shortened to four or less days, the world would
in some very small degree be better than it is. In chapter 7, "The Suffer
ing of Beasts," van Inwagen apparently denies what seems to me, and to
many others, to be "a reasonable belief."
I will now tell a story, a story that, I maintain, is true for all anyone
knows, a story according to which God allows beasts to suffer (and
in which the extent of their suffering and the ways in which they suf
fer are the actual extent and the actual ways). The story comprises
the following four propositions:
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(1) Every world God could have made that contains higher-level
sentient creatures either contains patterns of suffering moral
ly equivalent to those of the actual world, or else is massively
irregular.
(2) Some important intrinsic or extrinsic good depends on the ex
istence of higher-level sentient creatures; this good is of suf
ficient magnitude that it outweighs the patterns of suffering
found in the actual world.
(3) Being massively irregular is a defect in a world, a defect at
least as great as the defect of containing patterns of suffering
morally equivalent to those found in the actual world.
(4) The world—the cosmos, the physical universe—has been cre
ated by God.16

When van Inwagen moved from his discussion of the global problem of
evil to the local argument from evil, I thought, on first reading, that in tak
ing up the case of the fawn's suffering he was shifting his attention from
so-called logical arguments from evil to what are often described as evi
dential arguments from evil: arguments that aim at establishing not that
God's existence is impossible, but only that God's existence is unlikely. But
the more one reflects on the argument just stated, the more it appears to
be a response to a logical argument against the existence of God. Consider
the first premise of his argument. Rephrasing it slightly we have:
Every possible world God could have actualized that contains higherlevel sentient contains patterns of suffering morally equivalent to those of
the actual world, or else is massively irregular.
As we've noted, this pessimistic view of possible worlds an omnipotent
being is able to actualize assumes, without any argument, that miraculous
interventions by God either are impossible or useless. Morever, it suggests
that a common religious practice may be senseless. (When Christians pray
to God to heal them, or to lead some poor soul to Christ, they do so in
the belief that should God do so, the world may well be better than it
otherwise would be.) So, if God exists, among the possible worlds will be
worlds that are otherwise the same except for miraculous interventions by
God. And, as we've noted, along with the actual world in which the fawn
suffers for five days, there is a world in which God intervenes to help the
fawn die swiftly. And should he have done so, it simply isn't true that the
world would then and there be massively irregular.17 If that is the best
that van Inwagen can do, the problem of evil will continue to be a serious
obstacle to the credibility of theism.
Purdue University

NOTES
1.
His lectures are published as: Peter van Inwagen, The Problem o f Evil
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
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2. The Problem o f Evil, p. 97. While I agree with van Inwagen on this point,
in making it he departs from what I take to be the traditional theist's response
to the evidential problem of evil. That response is that God permits such hor
rendous evils to occur only to secure some outweighing good or to prevent
some evil just as bad or worse. In the case of human beings, the good in ques
tion is often taken to be the ability to exercise libertarian freedom of will.
3. The Problem o f Evil, p. 97.
4. Ibid., pp. 97-98.
5. Ibid., p. 99. This remark is somewhat puzzling. One would think that
if an evil e is subtracted from a whole consisting of e & g, where g is some
thing good, that the result would be either less bad or better than the whole
consisting of e & g. And a similar point holds if the whole consists of two
independent goods, g1 and g2. If we subtract g1 from this whole and are left
with only g2, one would expect the whole is less good than it was—at least
this appears to be so if the goodness of g1 and the goodness of g2 are respec
tively independent.
6. With the help of my colleague, Michael Bergmann.
7. The Problem o f Evil, p. 97.
8. “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American Philo
sophical Quarterly 16 (1979).
9. I'm ignoring here the remote possibility that the world contains an in
finite number of van Inwagen horrors.
10. The Problem o f Evil, p. 80.
11. It is standard Christian doctrine that God is able to bring about mira
cles such as turning water into wine, and bringing back to life someone who
is dead. But not knowing van Inwagen's view on such matters, I won't suggest
that he thinks God could have performed a miracle and simply restored the
fawn to the form of life it enjoyed before being stuck by the falling tree.
12. The Problem o f Evil, p. 88.
13. Ibid., p. 88.
14. Ibid., p. 97.
15. “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American Philo
sophical Quarterly 16 (1979).
16. The Problem o f Evil, pp. 113-14
17. Of course, were God to intervene constantly, or even very frequently,
the world would be massively irregular. But, if anything, the evidence avail
able to us seems to show that he doesn't intervene at all. (It is possible, of
course, that God does intervene but in ways that are hidden from human
understanding.)

